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GAG CLAUSES AND THE RIGHT TO GRIPE: THE CONSUMER
REVIEW FAIRNESS ACT OF 2016 & STATE EFFORTS TO
PROTECT ONLINE REVIEWS FROM CONTRACTUAL
CENSORSHIP
Clay Calvert*
A BSTRACT
This article examines new legislation, including the federal Consumer
Review Fairness Act, signed into law in December 2016, targeting nondisparagement clauses in consumer contracts. Such “gag clauses” typically
prohibit or punish the posting of negative reviews of businesses on
websites, such as Yelp and TripAdvisor. This article asserts that state and
federal statutes provide the best means, from a pro-free-expression
perspective, of attacking such clauses, given the disturbingly real possibility
that the First Amendment has no bearing on contractual obligations
between private parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2016 presidential election season, Democrats and
Republicans alike complained about nearly everything—the opposing
nominee,1 their own nominee,2 fake news,3 presidential debates,4 media

* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University.
Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks graduate students Minch Minchin,
Austin Vining and Sebastian Zarate, as well as undergraduates Jessie Goodman, Lynne
Higby, Sophia Karnegis, Haley Schaekel, Jayde Shulman, Van Miller and Olivia Vega of the
University of Florida for their review of early drafts of this article.
1
See, e.g., Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton to Portray Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy
Positions
as
Dangerous,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
1,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-foreignpolicy.html (quoting Jake Sullivan, Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s top policy
adviser, for the proposition that Republican nominee “Donald Trump is unlike any
presidential candidate we’ve seen, maybe ever, certainly in decades, in that he does not cross
the threshold of fitness for the job”); Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Returns Fire,
Calling Hillary Clinton a ‘World-Class Liar,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/politics/trump-speech-clinton.html (reporting that
Republican nominee Donald Trump called Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton a “worldclass liar” and claimed she “may be the most corrupt person ever to seek the presidency”);
Michael Wolff, Wolff: Derailing the Trump Train, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2016, 7:02 PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/wolff/2016/08/07/wolff-derailing-trumptrain/88289836/ (“The case, made by Republicans, Democrats and, more and more without
restraint, the news media, gets stronger every day: Donald Trump is dangerous, unfit and
crazy. And the conclusion becomes ever-more emphatic: He must not be president.”).
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bias,5 and the vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United States.6 It is
fitting, then, that one of the only measures members of Congress from both
2

See, e.g., Amy Chozick et al., Hillary Clinton Struggles to Find Footing in Unusual
Race, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/us/politics/hillaryclinton-donald-trump.html (“In the corridors of Congress, on airplane shuttles between New
York and Washington, at donor gatherings and on conference calls, anxiety is spreading
through the Democratic Party that Mrs. Clinton is struggling to find her footing.”); Scott
Clement, Will Immigration, Guns and Abortion be Wedge Issues in 2016?, W ASH . P OST ,
(July 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/20/willimmigration-guns-and-abortion-be-wedge-issues-in-2016/ (“Roughly three-quarters of
persuadable Republicans dislike Trump and a similar share of persuadable Democrats dislike
Clinton.”); Adam Nagourney, Convention Offers Donald Trump His Biggest Sales
Opportunity,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
18,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/politics/convention-offers-donald-trump-hisbiggest-sales-opportunity.html (reporting that during the Republican Convention in
Cleveland, Donald Trump faced “the challenge of reassuring Republicans unhappy with
their candidate, symbolized by the absence of so many party leaders, while using the event
to expand his appeal to a broader electorate”); Frank Newport & Andrew Dugan, Clinton
Still Has More Negatives Among Dems than Sanders, G ALLUP (June 6, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/192362/clinton-negatives-among-demssanders.aspx (reporting the results of a poll conducted in late May and early June of 2016
among voters who identified as Democrats that revealed that Bernie Sanders, who shortly
thereafter failed to win the Democratic party nomination, “continues to be significantly more
popular than Hillary Clinton. Sanders’ current net favorable rating among Democrats (+52)
outpaces Clinton’s (+39) by 13 points.”); Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats’ Weak Bench
Undermines Hope of Taking Back Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/us/politics/democrats-weak-bench-undermines-hopeof-taking-back-senate.html(noting that Republicans “find themselves in a fundamental
conflict between Mr. Trump’s populist insurgents and traditional conservatives”).
3
In December 2016, erstwhile Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton railed against what
she called an “epidemic of malicious fake news” and “voiced support for some federal
legislation to address the ‘fake news’ issue.” Paul Kane, Hillary Clinton Attacks ‘Fake
News’ in Post-election Appearance on Capitol Hill, W ASH . P OST , (Dec. 8. 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/08/hillary-clinton-attacksfake-news-in-post-election-appearance-on-capitol-hill/.
4
See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Patrick Healy, Actually, a Malfunction Did Affect
Donald Trump’s Voice at the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/politics/donald-trump-debate.html (reporting that
the Commission on Presidential Debates determined that the first debate “was marred by an
unspecified technical malfunction that affected the volume of Donald J. Trump’s voice in the
debate hall,” and noting that Trump “complained that the changing volume had distracted
him and alleged again that someone had created the problem deliberately”); Philip Rucker et
al., As Clinton Builds on a Strong Debate, Trump Lobs Attacks and Complaints, W ASH .
P OST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-clinton-builds-on-astrong-debate-trump-lobs-attacks-and-complaints/2016/09/27/6bb4cd2e-84cc-11e6-92c214b64f3d453f_story.html?utm_term=.fa2b56f633ea (reporting that, after a presidential
debate in September 2016 at Hofstra University, Republican nominee Donald Trump
claimed “debate moderator Lester Holt, the anchor of ‘NBC Nightly News,’ was biased, and
the Republican complained about the quality of his microphone”).
5
See, e.g., Noah Bierman, Donald Trump Helps Bring Far-right Media’s Edgier
Elements into the Mainstream, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016, 8:35 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-media-20160820-snap-story.html
(“A
Morning Consult poll released Friday found a plurality of Americans of all political stripes –
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sides of the aisle agreed on that year was a bill7 safeguarding—you guessed
it— the right to complain. Introduced in the House of Representatives in
April 2016 by Republican Leonard Lance of New Jersey and Democrat
Joseph Kennedy III of Massachusetts,8 the Consumer Review Fairness Act
of 2016 passed the House in September 2016.9 The Senate then
unanimously approved it without amendment two months later.10 President
Barack Obama, in turn, signed the bill into law on December 14, 2016.11
Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), the law generally voids nondisparagement clauses—colloquially called gag clauses12 or, less ominously
and forebodingly, customer waivers13—in form contracts14 that either
38% – believed the media were biased in trying to help elect Hillary Clinton president, a far
greater percentage than the 12% who said the media were biased in favor of Trump.”)
(emphasis added); Alexander Burns & Nick Corasaniti, Donald Trump’s Other Campaign
Foe: the ‘Lowest Form of Life’ News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/us/politics/donald-trump-obama-isis.html (“Long a
vehement critic of the political news media, Mr. Trump has increasingly organized his
general-election effort around antagonizing the press. He dedicates long sections of his
speeches and innumerable tweets to savaging individual outlets, and claiming that media
bias could effectively ‘rig’ the election for Hillary Clinton.”) (emphasis added).
6
See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, As Donald Trump Falters, Democrats Plan to Press Fight
for
Supreme
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/us/politics/donald-trump-democrats-supremecourt.html (“The Senate has been stuck in a stalemate since the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia in February left a vacancy on the bench. Republicans have refused to hold
confirmation hearings on President Obama’s nominee, insisting that the next president
should make the choice.”); The Editorial Board, The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y.
T IMES , (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/opinion/the-senatesconfirmation-shutdown.html (complaining that the failure by U.S. Senate Republicans to
provide confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland was “shameful”
and that it left the nation’s high court “hamstrung, unable to deliver conclusive rulings on
some of the most pressing legal issues facing the country”).
7
H.R. 5111, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
8
Paul Muschick, Businesses Can’t Block Customer Reviews from Leaving Online
Reviews,
MORNING
CALL
(Dec.
28,
2016,
6:07
PM),
http://www.mcall.com/news/local/watchdog/blog/mc-consumer-reviews-cant-be-bannedwatchdog-20161221-column.html.
9
Stephanie Mlot, Congress Passes Bill Protecting Consumer Reviews, PC M AGAZINE ,
(Nov. 30, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/news/349960/congress-passes-billprotecting-consumer-reviews.
10
Id.
11
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1359 (2016);
Andrew Tarantola, President Obama signs the Consumer Review Fairness Act into law,
ENGADGET (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/15/president-obama-signsthe-consumer-review-fairness-act-into-law/.
12
See Christopher Elliott, A Pending Bill Would Prohibit Retribution for Negative
TripAdvisor
and
Yelp
Reviews,
WASH.
POST,
(Sept.
22,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/a-pending- bill-would- prohibit-retributionfor-negative-tripadvisor-and-yelp-reviews/2016/09/22/9cf39396-7e9d-11e6-8d0cfb6c00c90481_story.html.
13
Chris Moran & Ashlee Kieler, Speak Freely America: New Federal Law Outlaws Gag
Clauses That Punish You for Negative Reviews, C ONSUMERIST , (Dec. 14, 2016, 9:30 AM),
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penalize15 or prohibit16 a person entering into such an agreement with a
business, or another individual from reviewing or assessing the
performance of “the goods, services, or conduct”17 of that business or
individual. The law vests the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with
primary enforcement authority,18 but also allows state attorneys general and
consumer protection officers to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf
of their residents after clearing several procedural hurdles.19 The measure
does not ban defamation20 actions filed by reviewed businesses or
individuals when reviews are libelous.21
Ken Paulson, president of the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University and dean of the College of Media and Entertainment at Middle
Tennessee State University, calls the new law “a valuable piece of
legislation that prevents businesses from forcing consumers to give up their
free speech rights.”22 The bill’s co-sponsor, Representative Lance,
proclaimed after the measure cleared the Senate that it:
[I]s about protecting consumers posting honest feedback
online. Online reviews and ratings are critical in the
21st century and consumers should be able to post,
comment and tweet their honest and accurate feedback
without fear of retribution. Too many companies are
burying non-disparagement clauses in fine print and
https://consumerist.com/2016/12/14/consumer-review-freedom-act (“Seven years ago, we
first told you about businesses using gag orders – call them ‘customer waivers’ or ‘nondisparagement clauses,’ it’s all the same – to prevent their customers from exercising their
legally protected rights to voice their honest opinions.”).
14
The law defines a form contract as “a contract with standardized terms – (i) used by a
person in the course of selling or leasing the person’s goods or services; and (ii) imposed on
an individual without a meaningful opportunity for such individual to negotiate the
standardized terms.” 15 U.S.C. § 45b(a)(3)(A) (2017).
15
Id. § 45b(b)(1)(B) (rendering void a form contract that “imposes a penalty or fee
against an individual who is a party to the form contract for engaging in a covered
communication . . . .”).
16
Id. § 45b(b)(1)(A) (rendering void a form contract that “prohibits or restricts the
ability of an individual who is a party to the form contract to engage in a covered
communication . . . .”).
17
Id. § 15b(a)(2).
18
See id. § 15b(d)(1)–(2).
19
See id. § 15b(e)(1)–(6).
20
Defamation “is the tort theory that provides a civil remedy for communications that
harm a victim’s reputation.” Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for
Communications Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. C IN . L. R EV .
863, 868 (2003).
21
15 U.S.C. §15b(b)(2)(B) (providing that the law shall not be construed to affect “any
civil cause of action for defamation, libel, or slander, or any similar cause of action . . .”).
22
Steven Porter, Businesses Barred from Gagging Customer Reviews Under New U.S.
Law,
C HRISTIAN
S CI.
M ONITOR .
(Dec.
19,
2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2016/1219/Businesses-barred-from-gagging-customerreviews-under-new-US-law.
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going after consumers when they post negative feedback
online. This will now end.23
Similarly, in announcing the bill in April, 2016, co-sponsor Representative
Kennedy remarked that it “would ensure companies can never retaliate
against customers for simply expressing an opinion.”24 In light of such
lofty rhetoric, this article analyzes both the Consumer Review Fairness Act
of 2016 and state laws targeting consumer-review gag clauses. It
contextualizes these statutes within the broader framework of First
Amendment freedom of speech,25 which may prove irrelevant in purely
contractual settings between private parties.
Part I of the article explains more broadly the nature of nondisparagement clauses and their emergence in recent years as contractual
tools for stifling negative online reviews.26 Part II then evaluates the
relevance, or lack thereof, of the First Amendment in thwarting nondisparagement clauses.27 Next, Part III examines in greater depth the
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, as well as the two state efforts that
preceded it in California28 and Maryland29 in combatting gag clauses.30
Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting, at the macro-level of analysis,
that the use of non-disparagement clauses to squelch free expression
highlights the need for the Supreme Court31 to constitutionalize contract
law with a First Amendment overlay, much as it already has done in tort

23

Press Release, Leonard Lance, Congressman, New Jersey’s 7th District, Speaker Ryan
Signs Lance Bill (Dec. 2, 2016), https://lance.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/speakerryan-signs-lance-bill.
24
Press Release, Joe Kennedy, Congressman, 4th Dist. of Massachusetts, Kennedy,
Lance
Intro
Bill
to
Protect
Consumer
Reviews
(Apr.
28,
2016),
https://kennedy.house.gov/media/press-releases/kennedy-lance-intro-bill-to-protectconsumer-reviews.
25
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ..” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental
liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
26
Infra notes 36–100 and accompanying text.
27
Infra notes 101–138 and accompanying text.
28
See C AL . C IV . C ODE § 1670.8 (West 2017).
29
M D . C ODE A NN . C OM . L AW § 14-1325 (West 2017).
30
Infra notes 138-194 and accompanying text.
31
All cites referring to the “Supreme Court” mean the United States Supreme Court,
unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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law with the cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,32 Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell33 and Snyder v. Phelps,34 among other suggestions.35
I. G AGGING O NLINE C RITICS : T HE R ISE OF
N ON -D ISPARAGEMENT C LAUSES
This Part has two sections. Section A provides an overview of nondisparagement clauses, both historically and today. Section B then
describes a real-life example of the abuse of such provisions that captured
the attention of the United States Congress.
A. An Overview of the Problem
The Consumer Review Fairness Act is an exemplar of timely legislation
targeting a troublesome and growing problem. As the ABA Journal
reported in July 2016, some businesses increasingly are attempting “to
prohibit dissatisfied customers from posting negative yet authentic
reviews.”36 Earlier that year, the Washington Post noted that “nondisparagement clauses in contracts are multiplying.”37
These provisions detrimentally affect not only consumers, but also
review-centric websites, such as Yelp. Yelp “provides consumers with

32
376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court held that public officials who sue for libel
based on speech relating to their official duties must prove that the defamatory statement in
question “was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279-80.
33
485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Falwell, the Court held that public figures and public officials
who sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) based on parodic and
satirical speech must prove, in addition to the requisite IIED tort elements, “that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was
true.” Id. at 56.
34
562 U.S. 443 (2011). In Snyder, which involved several tort causes of action,
including ones for IIED and intrusion into seclusion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority that “[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment – ‘Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ – can serve as a defense in state tort suits,
including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 451.
35
Infra notes 194–232 and accompanying text.
36
Julianne Hill, Stars and Gripes: Legal Challenges Over Online Reviews Seek to
Separate
Fact
from
Fiction,
ABA
J.
(July
2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_challenges_over_online_reviews_seek_to
_separate_fact_from_fiction.
37
Christopher Elliott, Write a Negative Review and Get Sued? It Can Happen, but
Maybe
Not
for
Long,
W ASH .
P OST
(Jan.
14,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/write-a-negative-online-review-and-getsued-it-can-happen-but-maybe-not-for-long/2016/01/14/518f0aa6-b49b-11e5-9388466021d971de_story.html?utmterm=.63e143259066.
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search and review features for restaurants, retailers and other businesses.”38
It claimed in the first quarter of 2016 to have had “on a monthly average
basis, about [seventy-seven] million unique visitors . . . on desktop
computers and [sixty-nine] million on mobile devices . . . .”39 By the end of
the fourth quarter of 2017, more than one hundred and forty-eight million
reviews had been posted on Yelp, and “Yelp had a monthly average of
[twenty-nine] million unique visitors who visited Yelp via the Yelp app.”40
A common example of a non-disparagement contract term might involve
“a vacation home rental owner who stipulates in the fine print of a contract
that he may keep a deposit if a guest leaves an unflattering review.”41 As
USA Today noted in December 2015, “[s]ome businesses are lurking with
‘terms of service,’ often in fine print, that prohibit customers from writing
negative reviews. Such ‘gag clauses’ chill free speech and undermine
consumer power.”42 Indeed, the same newspaper also pointed out that “an
array of businesses across the country – wedding photographers, flooring
installers, online retailers, hotels, vacation rentals, and even some dentists
and doctors – have attempted to foist gag clauses on customers.”43
Consumer advocates assert that “most customers aren’t aware of nondisparagement clauses, which often are buried deep within boilerplate
language of the agreements.”44
When consumers upload negative reviews that violate gag clauses, they
may be sued.45 For instance, a Texas couple was sued in 2016 after they
breached a non-disparagement clause with a pet-sitting company called
Prestigious Pets by posting a negative, one-star review of it on Yelp.46 The
38

James F. Peltz, After Yahoo, These Tech Firms Look Ripe for a Sale, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-agenda-tech-mergers-20160801snap-htmlstory.html.
39
Id.
40
About Us, Y ELP , https://www.yelp.com/about (last visited May 2, 2018).
41
See Elliot, supra note 37.
42
Gag clauses' chill consumers' free speech: Our view, USA T ODAY (Dec. 24, 2015,
5:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/12/23/consumer-reviews-gag-firstamendment-editorials-debates/77801050/.
43
Id.
44
Jenni Bergal, Consumers Now Have the Right to Gripe Online, P EW C HARITABLE
T RS .
(Dec.
15,
2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/15/consumers-now-have-the-right-to-gripe-online.
45
See Joseph Dussault, What the Yelp Defamation Case Could Mean for Internet Free
Speech,
C HRISTIAN
S CI.
M ONITOR
(Sept.
22,
2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/0922/What-the-Yelp-defamation-case-couldmean-for-internet-free-speech (“A bipartisan bill, sponsored by Reps. Joe Kennedy (D) of
Massachusetts and Leonard Lance (R) of New Jersey, seeks to protect customers against
‘non-disparagement’ clauses imposed by businesses. Customers have often signed such
contracts, and they are sued after publishing a negative review.”).
46
Sarah Mervosh, Plano Couple Sued for $1M over One-Star Yelp Review Asks Judge to
Drop
Suit,
D ALLAS
M ORNING
N EWS
(June
3,
2016),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/06/03/plano-couple-hit-with-1m-lawsuit-overone-star-yelp-review-asks-judge-to-drop-suit.
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gag clause at issue broadly provided that “your acceptance of this
agreement prohibits you from taking any action that negatively impacts
Prestigious Pets, LLC, its reputation, products, services, management,
employees or independent contractors.”47 Texas District Court Judge Jim
Jordan dismissed the company’s lawsuit with prejudice under the Lone Star
State’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation)48
statutes49 and awarded the defendant-couple, Robert and Michelle
Duchouquette, court costs and attorneys’ fees to be paid by Prestigious Pets
and its owner.50 According to attorney Paul Alan Levy of the Public
Citizen Litigation Group, the case marked “the first time a company
defended its non-disparagement clause with a brief,” and, perhaps more
significantly, the first time a judge refused to enforce a consumer-review
gag clause.51
Although the outcome in that case was favorable from a pro-free speech
perspective, the cost of breaching a gag clause can multiply fast because, as
Professor Lucille Ponte recently notes, gag clauses frequently are
accompanied by “liquidated damages clauses that set out daily penalties for
posting a critical review until the posting is removed.”52
Gag clauses tend, somewhat intuitively, to be viewpoint based, allowing
favorable reviews while stifling only negative ones. As Professor Ponte
explains:
These kinds of agreements are typically not purely
contracts of silence that prohibit all speech, as positive
reviews and comments are not only desirable but good
for a business’s customer relationships and bottom line.
Rather, a nondisparagement clause prevents consumers
from making or posting any negative remarks,

47
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, McWhorter v.
Duchouquette,
No.
DC-16-03561
(Tex.
Dist.
Ct.,
July
19,
2016),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PPTCPAOpposition.pdf.
48
Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 n.30 (2006) (describing SLAPP as an acronym that stands
for strategic lawsuit against public participation).
49
See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE ANN. §§ 27.001–27.011 (West 2016).
50
Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, McWhorter v. Duchouquette, No. DC-1603561
(Tex.
Dist.
Ct.,
Aug.
26,
2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3038039/Prestigious-Pets-Order-ofDismissal.pdf.
51
Paul Alan Levy, Texas Court Strikes Down Prestigious Pets’ Nondisparagement
Clause Lawsuit, PUB. CITIZEN C ONSUMER L. & P OL ’ Y B LOG (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2016/08/texas-court-strikes-down-prestigious-petsnondisparagement-clause-lawsuit.html.
52
Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer “Gag”
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 W M . & M ARY B US . L. R EV .
59, 79 (2016).
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criticisms, or ridicule about a business, its goods, and/or
its services.53
Some gag clauses, as attorneys David Bell and Tiffany Ferris write,
“transfer copyright ownership in any review written about a particular
business to that business.”54
This duplicitous intellectual property
maneuver, the duo notes, “gives the business the right to have reviews
removed from third-party review websites and forums . . . .”55 Indeed, the
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 includes a provision that
specifically addresses and voids such transfers of intellectual-property
rights.56
Gag clauses do more, however, than just extinguish criticism. Professor
Lauren Willis asserts, “they’re bad for the economy. One way that markets
become more efficient is by information getting out there, consumer to
consumer.”57 In other words, two types of markets—literal economic ones,
as well as metaphorical idea marketplaces58—are stunted by nondisparagement clauses. In fact, Paul Levy, an attorney for the watchdog
group Public Citizen,59 stresses that gag clauses “hurt other businesses that
53

Ponte, supra note 52, at 67.
David A. Bell & Tiffany Ferris, A Congressional Anti-Gag Maneuver: Senate
Unanimously Approves the Consumer Review Freedom Act, H AYNES & B OONE , LLC (Jan.
27, 2016), http://www.haynesboone.com/publications/a-congressional-anti-gag-maneuver.
55
Id.
56
15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1)(C) (2017). The new law voids a form contract if it:
54

[T]ransfers or requires an individual who is a party to the form contract to transfer
to any person any intellectual property rights in review or feedback content, with
the exception of a non-exclusive license to use the content, that the individual
may have in any otherwise lawful covered communication about such person or
the goods or services provided by such person.
Id.

57

David Lazarus, Lawmakers Seek to End the Muzzling of Consumers by Some
Businesses, L.A. T IMES (May 8, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-filazarus-20150508-column.html.
58
The marketplace of ideas theory of free expression “represents one of the most
powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for laypersons.” MATTHEW D.
BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH 2 (2001). It has been described as “the dominant First
Amendment metaphor.” LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION
237 (1991). Dean Rodney Smolla calls the marketplace of ideas “perhaps the most powerful
metaphor in the free speech tradition,” with its premise “that humankind’s search for truth is
best advanced by a free trade in ideas.” R ODNEY A. S MOLLA , F REE S PEECH IN AN O PEN
S OCIETY 6 (1992). In other words, under this theory, a primary “justification for free speech
is that it contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing
Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003).
59
Public Citizen describes itself on its website as “a nonprofit consumer advocacy
organization that champions the public interest” and that “resist[s] corporate power and
work[s] to ensure that government works for the people – not for big corporations.” About
Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2306 (last visited May 2, 2018).
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operate on the up-and-up and don’t need these clauses to protect
themselves.”60
Ultimately, the use of gag clauses “threatens the openness of the digital
economy.”61 They thus fall within what Professor David Orozco recently
called “a broad array of strategic corporate legal bullying practices that
violate fundamental business norms such as fairness, reciprocity,
reputation, and community responsiveness.”62
The FTC began taking action against non-disparagement clauses in
2015. That is when it accused weight-loss powder marketer Roca Labs of
using gag clauses to stop negative reviews of its multimillion-dollar
business.63 As the FTC asserted in a press release, Florida-based Roca Labs
“attempted to intimidate their own customers from sharing truthful – and
truly negative – reviews of their products.”64
The FTC’s complaint, filed September 2015 in federal court against
Roca Labs and two of its officers, alleges that Roca’s use of gag clauses
“have caused or are likely to cause purchasers to refrain from commenting
negatively about the Defendants or their products.
By depriving
prospective purchasers of this truthful, negative information, Defendants’
practices have resulted or are likely to result in consumers buying Roca
Labs products they would not otherwise have bought.”65 The FTC contends
that gag clauses “constitute unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) and (n).”66 The gag clause in Roca Labs’
online agreement provided:
60
Jennie Bergal, The Right to Gripe: States Seek to Protect Negative Online Reviews,
P EW C HARITABLE T RS . (June 16, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/06/16/the-right-to-gripe-states-seek-to-protect-negative-onlinereviews.
61
Reid Goldsborough, The Do’s and Don’t’s of Free Speech Online, INFO. TODAY INC.
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.infotoday.com/LinkUp/The-Dos-and-Donts-of-Free-SpeechOnline-108310.shtml.
62
David Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & B US . 137, 140 (2016). As
Orozco writes, “[t]o silence negative critiques made against them, companies sometimes
assert tenuous disparagement claims against individuals or small businesses who make
negative statements. These entities abuse the legal system by threatening legal action to
silence any negative criticism.” Id. at 168.
63
John Hielscher, FTC Sues Sarasota Firm, Alleging False Claims, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIB.
(Oct.
2,
2015,
4:09
PM).
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20151002/News/605203848/SH/.
64
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Marketers Who Used “Gag Clauses,”
Monetary Threats, and Lawsuits to Stop Negative Consumer Reviews for Unproven WeightLoss Products (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/09/ftcsues-marketers-who-used-gag-clauses-monetary-threats-lawsuits.
65
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 22, Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Roca Labs, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-02231-MSS-TBM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150928rocalabscmpt.pdf.
66
Id. at 28. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (“Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.”); Id. § 45(n) (providing the FTC with the power to declare
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You agree that regardless of your personal experience
with RL, you will not disparage RL and/or any of its
employees, products, or services. This means that you
will not speak, publish, or cause to be published, print,
review, blog, or otherwise write negatively about RL, or
its products or employees in any way.67
By April, 2016, the FTC and Roca Labs reportedly were on the verge of
settling the matter,68 but the case was still ongoing in early 2017.69
Signaling, perhaps, that the FTC might fight other businesses that deploy
such gag clauses, FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny highlighted the
case against Roca Labs in a November 2016 keynote speech at the
Association of National Advertisers and Brand Activation Association’s
marketing law conference in Chicago.70
Despite the FTC’s recent actions targeting them, gag clauses are not
new. Traditionally, they were applied in contexts other than online
business reviews. For example, the New York Times reported in 1996 that
health maintenance organizations (“H.M.O.s”) were imposing gag clauses
on physicians that “limited their ability to talk freely with patients about
treatment options and H.M.O. payment policies.”71

unlawful an “act or practice [that] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”).
67
Lesley Fair, Gagging Rights? FTC Case Challenges Diet Claims and Company’s Use
of Consumer Gag Clauses, FTC B US . B LOG (Sept. 28, 2015, 9:13 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/09/gagging-rights-ftc-casechallenges-diet-claims-companys-use.
68
Dani Kass, FTC, Supplement Co. Request Stay in False Ad Suit, L AW 360 (Apr. 18,
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/785821/ftc-supplement-co-request-stay-in-false-adsuit.
69
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Roca Labs, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5298 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 13, 2017) (involving a motion for contempt and sanctions against a non-party witness in
the case).
70
Terrell McSweeny, FTC Commissioner, Keynote Remarks at the 2016 ANA/BAA
Marketing
Law
Conference
(Nov.
10,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/996554/mcsweeny__keynote_remarks_at_ana-baa_marketing_law_conference_11-10-16.pdf.
71
Associated Press, U.S. Healthcare to End Limits on Doctors’ Advice to Patients, N.Y.
T IMES (Feb. 6, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/06/business/us-healthcare-to-endlimits-on-doctors-advice-to-patients.html. See Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O.’s Limit
What
They
Can
Tell
Patients,
N.Y.
T IMES
(Dec.
21,
1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/21/us/doctors-say-hmo-s-limit-what-they-can-tellpatients.html (“Doctors across the country say that health maintenance organizations
routinely limit their ability to talk freely with patients about treatment options and H.M.O.
payment policies, including financial bonuses for doctors who save money by withholding
care.”).
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Although the actual extent of the use of gag clauses affecting doctors
was “hotly contested,”72 the United States Department of Health and
Human Services quickly stepped into the fray to hold that “H.M.O.’s may
not limit what doctors tell Medicare patients about medical treatment
options.”73 Multiple states also took legislative action against gag clauses
in H.M.O. contracts.74 By 1999, as Professor William Sage wrote in the
Columbia Law Review, “nearly every state [had] enacted legislation
outlawing contractual restrictions on disclosure” in managed-care
contracts.”75 In brief, there is ample precedent for lawmakers taking
effective action against gag clauses.
While gag clauses in H.M.O. contracts may be a relic of the past, they
are “increasingly common” today in contexts beyond consumer reviews,
such as employment contracts, where they ban “former employees from
criticizing their erstwhile employer.”76 Additionally, as Professor Genelle
Belmas and attorney Brian Larson observed in 2007, “[s]oftware
manufacturers have also included clauses that forbid publication of any
review of their products without consent.”77 Furthermore, the New York
Times reported in June 2016 that a number of for-profit universities include
enrollment contracts featuring gag clauses that:
[B]ar students or former students from telling others
about the complaint resolution process or the specifics of
any final ruling. And internal process requirements
prohibit students from taking their complaints public
without first going through the school’s own process. In
some cases, schools try to bar people from taking
complaints elsewhere – even if the internal process
yields no relief.78
72

Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag
Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 A M . J.L. & M ED . 433, 441 (1996).
73
Robert Pear, The Gag is Off H.M.O. Doctors, N.Y. T IMES (Dec. 8, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/weekinreview/the-gag-is-off-hmo-doctors.html.
74
See Justin D. Harris, Health and Welfare: The Timely Demise of “Gag Orders” in
Physicians’ Contracts with Managed Care Providers, 28 P AC . L.J. 906, 910 (1997) (“A
number of other states have responded to the growing dissatisfaction with HMOs by passing
legislation that, like the newer California legislation, prohibits HMOs from inserting gag
clauses in their contracts.”).
75
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Healthcare, 99 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1701, 1748–49 (1999).
76
David Lazarus, Whistle-blowing: Insurer Gets Smacked for Bullying Employees, L.A.
T IMES (Aug. 19, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarushealthnet-whistleblower-20160819-snap-story.html.
77
Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: The
Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 37-38 (2007).
78
Don’t Force Students to Sign Away Their Rights, N.Y. T IMES (June 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/opinion/dont-force-students-to-sign-away-theirrights.html.
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A 2016 study by the Century Foundation79 “found gag clauses in about
one in every ten enrollment contracts at for-profit colleges receiving federal
aid. No such provisions were found at nonprofit, public, or privately
funded for-profit institutions.”80 The study noted that an enrollmentcontract gag clause “inserts a firewall between wronged students, reducing
the likelihood that they will learn about each other’s complaints, preventing
them from working together to seek a better resolution.”81
The next section turns to a real-life example that vividly demonstrates
the destructive impact of gag clauses not only on free expression, but also
on individual emotional tranquility and familial fiscal stability.
B. The Case of Jennifer Palmer
In November 2015, during testimony before the United States Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Jennifer Palmer
explained how a non-disparagement clause, supposedly buried in a termsof-sale-and-use agreement with an online business called KlearGear,
wreaked havoc on both her life and her husband’s credit rating.82
Specifically, in late 2008 her husband, John Palmer, ordered and paid for
two items online from KlearGear.83 After the items never arrived, the
Palmers were told via email by a KlearGear representative that the order
was unpaid and therefore cancelled.84 The Palmers were never able to
speak with anyone at KlearGear, however, because the phone numbers on
the company’s website merely provided automated responses.85
Growing frustrated with the service and what she called “the
impossibility of reaching anyone,”86 Jennifer then took a step in February
2009 that would later haunt her and her husband: she posted her opinions
about KlearGear on a website called RipoffReport.com.87 It was not until

79

This organization describes itself as “a progressive, nonpartisan think tank that seeks
to foster opportunity, reduce inequality, and promote security at home and abroad.” About
the Century Foundation, CENTURY FOUND., https://tcf.org/about (last visited May 2, 2018).
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Tariq Habash & Robert Shireman, How College Enrollment Contracts Limit Students’
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81
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Zero Stars: How Gagging Honest Reviews Harms Consumers and the Economy:
Hearing on S. 2044 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 114th Cong. (2015)
[hereinafter “Palmer Testimony”] (statement of Jennifer Kulas Palmer, Plaintiff, Palmer v.
KlearGear),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/2966d0eb-8812-4035ae59-4b75979864e4/93F3E6B5DE58928F85DF4367AEC0373A.jen-palmer-testimony.pdf.
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May, 2012 that the trouble started. That’s when, as Jennifer testified, her
husband:
[R]eceived an email from KlearGear demanding that
John have the review on RipoffReport.com removed
within 72 hours, or pay KlearGear $3,500 for violations
of their Terms of Sale and Use. . . . KlearGear claimed
that my review violated a “non-disparagement clause” in
KlearGear’s Terms of Sale and Use, the text of which
barred the customer – who was John, not me, but that
didn’t matter to them – from “taking any action that
negatively impacts KlearGear.com, its reputation,
products, services, management or employees.” John
did some research . . . and discover[ed] that the clause
wasn’t even present in the Terms of Sale when he placed
his order back in December 2008. He found that the
clause did not appear until February 2012.
Jennifer attempted to remove her review, but as she told the Senators at the
hearing, RipoffReport.com’s policy prohibits removals.88 She testified that
her husband then:
[T]ried explaining to KlearGear that the “nondisparagement clause” was not in the Terms of Sale and
Use at the time of John’s order from KlearGear; that it
was I, not John, who wrote the review; and
RipoffReport.com’s policy of not removing reviews
meant we had no control over whether the review
remained online. The person claiming to be KlearGear’s
legal representative just reiterated to us that “this matter
will remain open until the published content is
removed,” and threatened to report the $3,500 as a debt
to the credit reporting agencies.89
Indeed, the $3,500 later showed up as debt owed to KlearGear on John
Palmer’s credit reports with Experian and Equifax, two of the three major
credit-reporting companies in the United States.90 Jennifer testified that it
took more than eighteen months to remove the information from her
husband’s credit reports91—a result coming only after the watch-dog group

88

Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 1-2.
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2.
90
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2.
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89
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Public Citizen filed suit on the Palmers’ behalf against KlearGear.92 The
Palmers won a default judgment against KlearGear, which failed to defend
the case.93
Before the lawsuit and prior to the removal of the KlearGear debt from
John Palmer’s credit record, however, he experienced difficulty obtaining a
car loan and was denied a credit card.94 The Palmers were also refused
financing by several companies for buying a new furnace after their old one
broke as winter approached.95
On top of the fiscal woes, Jennifer further testified about the emotional
toll, noting “the humiliation of having to explain everything”96 and “living
in fear”97 of “not being able to get emergency credit for basic needs.”98 In
fact, one of the causes of action in the Palmers’ complaint filed in federal
court in Utah was for intentional infliction of emotional distress.99
The bottom line, as Jennifer explained, was that her “story shows what
can happen when companies are allowed to use non-disparagement clauses
in their contracts to bully consumers. And it shows why Congress should
take action to prohibit the use of these clauses in consumer contracts.”100
Congress now has done precisely that with the Consumer Review Fairness
Act of 2016.
With this background on non-disparagement clauses and the real-world
example of the Palmers in mind, Part II addresses the bearing and
significance of the First Amendment on the enforceability of these
contractual terms.
II. G AG C LAUSES AND THE F IRST A MENDMENT: IS T HERE A
C ONSTITUTIONAL O VERLAY TO C ONTRACT L AW ?
More than a quarter-century ago, First Amendment scholar Vincent
Blasi of checking-value fame101 ruefully queried about gag clauses, “You
92
Complaint, Palmer v. KlearGear.com, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2013)
[hereinafter “Palmer Complaint”], http://www.citizen.org/documents/Palmer-v-KleargearComplaint.pdf.
93
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 3.
94
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2-3.
95
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 3.
96
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2.
97
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 3.
98
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 3.
99
Palmer Complaint, supra note 92, at 15. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress typically is defined as consisting “of four elements: (1) the defendant’s conduct must
be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3) the
defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress must be
severe.” Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000).
100
Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 1.
101
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 A M . B AR F OUND .
R ES . J. 521 (1977).
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can’t sell yourself into slavery. So can you sell yourself into silence? It
would seem to me there are some inalienable rights you can’t sign away.”102
It is a critical, yet relatively understudied, issue. As Professor Alan
Garfield observed in 1998, “[t]he extent to which a party can bind himself
contractually to silence is largely unexplored in American case law and
legal literature.”103
If the First Amendment were to apply to gag clauses, then its general
prohibition against prior restraints104 would be directly relevant. A prior
restraint, the Supreme Court has held, is a “restraint on future speech,”105
often occurring in the form of “court orders that actually forbid speech
activities.”106 It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence,
in turn, that prior restraints on speech are presumptively unconstitutional.107
Although gag clauses prohibiting negative reviews certainly restrict
future expression, the threshold problem in challenging their
constitutionality is that the First Amendment protects the right of free
expression only from government action.108 As the Supreme Court wrote
four decades ago, “the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee
only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”109 It then added
that “while statutory or common law may in some situations extend
protection or provide redress against a private corporation or person who
seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress
is provided by the Constitution itself.”110
This militates, of course, against the First Amendment playing any role
in thwarting the application of a gag clause in a contract between a business

102
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See E RWIN C HEMERINSKY , C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW : P RINCIPLES AND P OLICIES 996
(5th ed. 2015) (pointing out that while “a clear definition of ‘prior restraint’ is elusive,”
perhaps “[t]he clearest definition of prior restraint is an administrative system or a judicial
order that prevents speech from occurring”).
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Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
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See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (observing that the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech and a free press “afford special protection against
orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular information or commentary –
orders that impose a ‘previous’ or ‘prior’ restraint on speech”); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
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See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) (observing that “the First
Amendment protects against the Government”).
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and a consumer. Simply put, a contractual gag clause may fall within the
realm of private law,111 not constitutional law.
In his 1998 article, Professor Garfield thus raised a crucial question
regarding the intersection of contract law, gag clauses, which fall within a
larger bucket of “contracts of silence,”112 as he aptly puts it, and the First
Amendment: “Are promises of silence different because they implicate the
First Amendment or violate a public policy favoring freedom of speech, or
are these constitutional and policy concerns irrelevant when a private party
agrees to silence himself?”113
On the one hand, Professor Garfield observes that “whereas the First
Amendment limits governmental suppression of speech, contractual
suppression of speech may not implicate the First Amendment.”114
Attorney Randolph Kline and his colleagues concur, noting that the First
Amendment does not “preclude agreements to limit one’s own speech. In
fact, private parties can voluntarily negotiate agreements among themselves
. . . to limit the speech rights the parties would otherwise possess.”115
Similarly, in addressing the problem of gag clauses found in software
license agreements, Professors Michael Rustad and Maria Onufrio wrote in
2012 that “[w]hen software licensors or other content providers impose
restrictions on speech, the First Amendment prohibition on prior restraints
is not applicable since there is no state action.”116 Furthermore, Professor
Kaiponanea Matsumurd in 2014 asserted that “agreements restricting free
speech,”117 in fact, “are routinely enforced”118 and that “the long-term trend
has favored”119 contractual waivers of speech rights.
Thus, while the First Amendment may limit the scope of speech-based
torts,120 it generally has no application in contract law. As Professors
Daniel Solove and Neil Richards sum it up, “[a]lthough tort law implicates
the First Amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence, the First

111

See Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 A KRON L. R EV . 1, 4
(2016) (“Private law is usually defined as the branch of law that addresses the relationships
between individuals, rather than between individuals and their governments.”).
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See Garfield, supra note 103, at 268 (asserting that “a ‘contract of silence’ is a
contract in which a party has made an enforceable promise to keep quiet about something”).
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Garfield, supra note 103, at 264.
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Garfield, supra note 103, at 344.
115
Randolph Kline, Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food Marketing and
Consumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 L OY . L.A. L. R EV .
603, 625 (2006).
116
Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of
Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. P A . J. B US . L. 1085, 1180 (2012).
117
Kaiponanea T. Matsumurd, Binding Future Selves, 75 L A . L. R EV . 71, 95 (2014).
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the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment freedom of speech applies in tort law).
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Amendment provides little to no restrictions when other private law rules
restrict speech. Such is the case with contract law and property law.”121
The case of Cohen v. Cowles Media122 provides some evidence of this.
There, the Court held that the First Amendment provided no defense against
a civil cause of action for promissory estoppel stemming from the breach of
a promise of confidentiality given by journalists to a source.123 As UCLA
Professor Eugene Volokh encapsulates the holding at its broadest, “[t]he
Supreme Court explicitly held in Cohen v. Cowles Media that contracts not
to speak are enforceable with no First Amendment problems. Enforcing
people’s own bargains, the Court concluded . . . doesn’t violate those
people’s rights, even if they change their minds after the bargain is
struck.”124
Nonetheless, as Professor Shelley Ross Saxer writes, the Court in Cohen
“found state action in a private breach of contract lawsuit involving a
confidential source who sued the newspaper company that exposed him
after agreeing to keep him anonymous.”125 On this issue, the Court in
Cohen wrote that “the application of state rules of law in state courts in a
manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes ‘state
action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”126 Byron White reasoned for
the five-justice majority that the state-law doctrine of promissory estoppel
“would be enforced through the official power of the Minnesota courts.
Under our cases, that is enough to constitute ‘state action’ for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”127
In brief, judicial enforcement of state contract law theory was sufficient
to trigger consideration of the First Amendment by the Court in Cohen
under principles of state action. Nonetheless, the First Amendment failed
to add a layer of constitutional protection because, as the Cohen Court
reasoned, generally applicable laws such as promissory estoppel “do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”128
Addressing the state action question, Professor Garfield points out that
“[j]udicial enforcement of a contract of silence may constitute state action
and thus implicate the First Amendment.”129 Most courts, however, do not
121
Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
C OLUM . L. R EV . 1650, 1660 (2009) (emphasis added).
122
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123
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124
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 S TAN . L. R EV . 1049,
1057 (2000).
125
Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer, State Action, and Judicial Takings, 21
W IDENER L.J. 847, 848 (2012).
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Id.
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recognize the proposition that judicial enforcement, by itself, constitutes
state action. For instance, in April 2016 a federal district court in California
turned back a First Amendment challenge to a contractual arbitration
agreement by rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument “that the mere fact of
judicial enforcement automatically establishes state action.”130 Indeed, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2013 opined that
“[i]n the context of First Amendment challenges to speech-restrictive
provisions in private agreements or contracts, domestic judicial
enforcement of terms that could not be enacted by the government has not
ordinarily been considered state action.”131
In fact, as Professor Mark Rosen observed in a 2004 article, “with
virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the judicial enforcement
of private agreements inhibiting speech does not trigger constitutional
review, despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on speech
would have.”132 Put even more bluntly by a Washington state appellate
court, “[s]tate enforcement of a contract between two private parties is not
state action, even where one party’s free speech rights are restricted by that
agreement.”133
Yet Professor Garfield emphasizes that the Supreme Court has long
applied a First Amendment overlay to state tort law,134 with recent cases
like Snyder v. Phelps135 illustrating this point. As Chief Justice John
Roberts observed for the eight-justice Snyder majority, “[t]he Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment—‘Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech’—can serve as a defense in state tort suits,
including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”136 In other
words, if a veneer of First Amendment jurisprudence can coat tort law, then
why can that amendment not similarly add a layer of constitutional
protection to contract law?
Ultimately, Garfield concludes, “there is no obvious answer”137
regarding whether the First Amendment imposes restrictions on gag clauses
entered into freely between private parties. He adds that even if the state
action of judicial enforcement makes the First Amendment applicable to
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contracts of silence, this still fails to resolve whether such a constitutional
right may be waived.138
With this unsettled state of First Amendment jurisprudence leaving a
gaping chasm between the speech interests of consumers and the
contractual rights of businesses to protect their reputations, both the federal
government and several states now are filling the void with statutes
rendering non-disparagement clauses invalid. Those laws are examined
below in Part III.
III. L EGISLATIVE R ESPONSES TO G AG C LAUSES: A NALYZING F EDERAL
AND S TATE “R IGHT TO G RIPE ” S TATUTES
This Part features two sections. Section A examines the federal
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, while Section B analyzes the
legislative efforts of both California and Maryland. They were the first two
states to tackle consumer-review gag clauses with legislation that predates
the new federal statute.
A. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016
A starting point for this analysis is the Consumer Review Fairness Act’s
definition of a non-disparagement clause. The Act, however, does not use
either the term “non-disparagement clause” or “gag clause.” Instead, it
employs the more neutral term “covered communication,”139 which it
defines as “a written, oral, or pictorial review,140 performance assessment
of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic means, the goods,
services, or conduct of a person by an individual who is party to a form
contract with respect to which such person is also a party.”141
This definition allows consumers to post reviews consisting of both
words and images. For instance, a person who believes a kitchen-cabinet
installer shoddily performed work could not only describe, via written text,
why she thinks the work was shoddy, but also post photographs and/or
videos offering seemingly more objective proof of inferior performance.
Such visual evidence is important because, as Chief Justice John Roberts’
pointed out in 2012, “a picture is worth a thousand words.”142
Second, it is important to understand that the Act does not ban all nondisparagement clauses. Specifically, it applies only when such clauses

138
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140
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appear in form contracts.143 Form contracts, per the statute, must: (i)
involve “standardized terms;”144 (ii) for the “selling or leasing of goods or
services”;145 and (iii) fail to provide a consumer with “a meaningful
opportunity . . . to negotiate the standardized terms.”146
The Act’s deployment of the term “form contract”147 may be strategic
because it conjures up visions of adhesion contracts, which carry more than
a whiff of unfairness. Indeed, contracts of adhesion, Professor Shelley
Smith writes, “are standardized form contracts presented by a party with
superior bargaining power to the ‘adherent’ as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’
proposition, giving them no alternatives other than complete adherence to
the terms presented or outright rejection.”148 Such contracts, however,
typically are enforceable under contract law principles149 unless the waiver
of rights in question is so vast and broad as to be unconscionable150 and
involves “a powerless party, usually a consumer, who has no real choice but
to accede to its terms.”151
Unconscionability, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit wrote in 2016, “has ‘both a procedural and a substantive element,
the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining
power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.’”152 As Professor
Andrea Boyack recently summarized it:
Adhesion contracts are enforceable, but legal theory has
evolved to take into account the lack of voluntariness
and content input inherent in adhesion contexts through
modern doctrines such as unconscionability and distinct
approaches to interpretation for adhesion contracts.
Courts recognize that traditional deference to contractual
terms may be inappropriate for contracts of adhesion,
143
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144
Id. § 45b(a)(3)(A).
145
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and they therefore sometimes monitor the substantive
fairness of a contract in an adhesion contract context.153
In addition to applying only to gag clauses found in form contracts, the
Consumer Review Fairness Act carves out multiple exemptions that truly
limit its reach to only consumer reviews. For example, employer-employee
contracts and independent-contractor agreements fall outside the Act’s
ambit.154 Additionally, the Act generally does not apply to non-disclosure
provisions affecting trade secrets,155 personnel files,156 medical
information157 and records compiled for law enforcement purposes.158
As explained earlier, in 2015, the FTC began attacking gag clauses as a
type of unfair business practice when it filed a complaint against weightloss marketer Roca Labs.159 The Consumer Review Fairness Act now
specifically codifies gag clauses in form contracts that fall within the Act’s
reach as unfair and deceptive practices.160 In turn, it gives the FTC the
power to enforce the Act.161
State attorneys general, as well as other authorized state consumer
protection officers,162 also can file civil lawsuits on behalf of their residents
under the Act,163 provided they, unless otherwise unfeasible,164 first notify
the FTC in writing of their intent to bring such a claim165 and accompany it
with “a copy of the complaint to be filed to initiate the civil action.”166 The
FTC may intervene in such state-driven lawsuits.167
Although the Consumer Review Fairness Act now applies nationwide as
federal legislation, both California and Maryland previously adopted their
own statutes targeting gag clauses. Those statutes, which remain valid and
thus provide a second layer of remedies for citizens in those states, are
addressed below in Section B.
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B. State Legislation
Prior to enactment of the federal Consumer Review Fairness Act of
2016, California and Maryland were the first states to implement laws
striking at the enforcement of non-disparagement clauses in consumer
contracts. These two state statutes are described below, thus adding
enriched context for understanding the federal legislation.
1. California
Assembly Bill 2365, commonly referred to as the “Yelp bill,”168 was
signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown in September 2014 and took
effect on January 1, 2015.169 The measure, Professor Eric Goldman
observes, became the “first-in-the-nation statute to stop businesses from
contractually gagging their consumers.”170
Codified at Section 1670.8 of the California Civil Code,171 the law is
much briefer in both length and number of clauses than the Consumer
Review Fairness Act of 2016. The California law provides, in key part, that
“[a] contract or proposed contract for the sale or lease of consumer goods or
services may not include a provision waiving the consumer’s right to make
any statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or agents, or
concerning the goods or services.”172
Unlike the federal legislation discussed earlier, this provision is not
limited in applicability to only form contracts. Additionally, and in contrast
to the federal statute, California’s statute does not carve out an exemption
for employer-employee contracts and independent-contractor agreements.
In terms of enforcement, the California statute embraces a tripartite tack.
Specifically, it allows consumers, the state attorney general, and local
officials (both district and county attorneys) to file civil actions.173 A first
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violation is subject to a maximum civil fine of $2,500, while second and
subsequent breaches cost $5,000.174
Furthermore, the California statute includes a provision closely akin to a
punitive damages clause. In particular, consumers or government officials
may collect an additional maximum of $10,000 if they can prove a
defendant’s violation of the statute was “willful, intentional, or reckless.”175
Although the sum of those fines initially seems paltry, they still will
likely cause a chilling effect on gag clause usage in California. As
Professor Goldman puts it, “[t]he penalties may be financially modest, but
any California business that is foolish enough to take an anti-review
contract to court will end up writing a check to their customers.”176
Significantly, California’s law stretches beyond the state’s borders. As
attorney Songmee Connolly explains, the measure “has no geographic
limitations and thus would apply to any consumer-facing entity or person
doing business in California. Thus, even out-of-state businesses with
prospective and current customers in California should ensure
compliance.”177
Finally, the California statute makes it clear that a citizen of the Golden
State can bring a lawsuit under California Civil Code § 1670.8 and any
other statutory or common law theory.178 Accordingly, California citizens
can invoke their state’s own statute targeting gag clauses and also request
the state’s attorney general to pursue a separate claim under the federal
Consumer Review Fairness Act.179
2. Maryland
House Bill 131, better known as the “Right to Yelp” bill,180 was signed
into law by Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan, Jr., on April 12, 2016.181
Hogan’s stroke of the pen made the Old Line State just the second in the
174
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nation, following California’s lead, to adopt a law banning consumerreview gag clauses.182
Codified at Section 14-1325 of Maryland’s commercial code, the new
legislation took effect in October 2016.183 Applying only to contracts
involving “the sale or lease of consumer goods or services,”184 the statute
renders “void and unenforceable”185 clauses that waive a “consumer’s right
to make any statement concerning: (1) The seller or lessor; (2) Employees
or agents of the seller or lessor; or (3) The consumer goods or services.”186
It also prohibits enforcement and threatened enforcement of such clauses,
as well as efforts to penalize consumers under such clauses.187
Maryland’s statute specifies two items that California’s gag-clause law
fails to address. In particular, and unlike California’s measure, Maryland’s
statute provides that individuals and businesses that believe they are
defamed in consumer reviews retain the power to file libel actions.188
Additionally, the Maryland statute exempts from its reach gag clauses
restricting consumer disclosure of trade secrets and intellectual property.189
California’s statute, in contrast, is silent on this type of content. In accord
with California’s measure,190 however, Maryland makes it clear that its law
generally does not restrict the ability of consumer-review websites such as
Yelp or TripAdvisor to take down reviews.191
In terms of enforcement authority, the Maryland statute provides that
violations of it constitute “unfair and deceptive trade practice[s]”192 under
Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act and, in turn, are “[s]ubject to the
enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of this article.”193
What does this mean? The general criminal penalty provision of Title 13
provides that “any person who violates any provision of this title is guilty of
a misdemeanor and, unless another criminal penalty is specifically provided
elsewhere, on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or
182
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imprisonment not exceeding one year or both, in addition to any civil
penalties.”194
With this analysis of both the federal Consumer Review Protection Act
and the California and Maryland non-disparagement statutes in mind, this
article concludes by calling on the Supreme Court to adopt a layer of First
Amendment protection to cover contract law cases in which an undue
burden is imposed on free expression. This approach, as becomes clear,
borrows a test from another constitutional law domain – namely, the
Court’s current abortion-barrier jurisprudence.
IV. C ONCLUSION
Both state laws and the federal Consumer Review Fairness Act may
successfully eradicate the pernicious effects of non-disparagement clauses
lurking in contracts between consumers and businesses. For this, these
articles of legislation merit praise and, in turn, the lawmakers behind them
deserve kudos.
Yet the larger constitutional question regarding the First Amendment’s
role in this contractual space lingers unresolved.195 Although not focusing
his analysis directly on gag clauses, Professor Donald Smythe lays a
possible foundation for the First Amendment to play such a part, at least
when contracts involve fictitious, state-created entities such as corporations.
Smythe argues:
[S]ince corporations are State-sponsored entities with
rights and privileges that individuals do not enjoy,
private
transactions
between
individuals
and
corporations raise questions about the nature of the State
sponsorship and its implications for the liberty of the
individuals. If liberty requires not just that individuals be
as free from coercion as possible, but also that they have
spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, and if the
transactions between individuals and corporations
intrude into individuals’ spheres of personal autonomy
and privacy, then the State may indirectly contribute to
the impingement upon the liberty of individuals through
its sponsorship of the corporations.196
In brief, the personal and individual autonomy of deciding whether or
not to speak is hindered by government-sanctioned businesses via gag
194
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clauses buried in form contracts, thus providing an entrée for First
Amendment applicability. Furthermore, in addition to impeding speakers’
rights, gag clauses also harm the rights of others – namely, the thousands of
people who visit consumer-review websites – to learn important
information that might very well influence where, how and on what goods
and services they spend money. Here, the unenumerated First Amendment
right to receive speech is deployable for buttressing the argument that
speaker autonomy is thwarted by gag clauses.197 As the Supreme Court
wrote more than a half-century ago, “the right of freedom of speech and
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read.”198
The First Amendment right to receive speech is exceptionally powerful
in precisely the same commercial and business contexts in which consumerreview gag clauses lurk and fester. Specifically, the Supreme Court
recognized more than forty years ago in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.199 that society has a “strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”200 It explained why
this is so when economic decisions are at stake:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.201
In accord with this logic, the unfettered flow of opinions and reviews
regarding businesses, services and products directly facilitates a “free
enterprise economy”202 by helping to ensure that “economic decisions”203 of
other potential consumers are “intelligent and well informed.”204 Gag
clauses throttle this process. The bottom line is that corporations, as
government-sanctioned businesses, harm the rights of both speakers
197
See generally Belmas & Larson, supra note 77, at 73 (“First Amendment
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198
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(consumers) and audiences (potential consumers) through the inclusion of
non-disparagement clauses.
Adding to the impetus for applying the First Amendment to cases
involving consumer non-disparagement clauses is the unequal nature of the
bargaining power between the individuals and entities involved. As
Professor Garfield argues, “not all contractual promises of silence should be
treated alike. Surely there is a difference between contracts entered into by
two parties of equal bargaining power and adhesion contracts signed by
employees or ‘clicked’ onto by consumers.”205
Yet, as Part III made clear, adhesion contracts generally are
enforceable.206 For example, one federal court noted that “an adhesion
contract is enforceable unless the plaintiff lacked a meaningful choice
whether to accept the provision in question and the provision is ‘so onesided as to be oppressive.’”207 Put slightly differently by another court,
“adhesion contracts are enforceable unless unconscionable,” and “[t]o
establish unconscionability, the plaintiffs must prove both that they lacked a
meaningful choice and that the terms of the contract were unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”208
The mere fact, however, that consumers fail to read the terms of online
agreements and therefore overlook inclusion of gag clauses is unlikely to
render such contracts unconscionable. To wit, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit notes that “[a] contract need not be read to
be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in
retrospect prove unwelcome.”209 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Iowa calls it
“well-settled that failure to read a contract before signing it will not
invalidate the contract.”210
Thus, to render a consumer-review gag clause invalid in the absence of
either the Consumer Review Fairness Act or similar state laws, a court not
only must find that the contract entered into by a consumer was, in fact, one
of adhesion, but also that it was unconscionable. This entails convincing a
judge of procedural unconscionability – perhaps the gag clause was in
smaller print than the rest of the agreement, was buried deep into the
agreement and/or was written vaguely or confusingly – and substantive
unconscionability. The substantive argument, in turn, needs to be that it is
an overly harsh, one-sided result211 for a person to forfeit his or her right to
205
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publicly criticize – but not, conversely, to laud or praise – a business,
thereby depriving others of possibly truthful information that might affect
their fiscal decisions.
A better approach, however, is for the Supreme Court to adopt a layer of
First Amendment protection when a form contract detrimentally affects an
individual’s right to express an opinion regarding the goods, services or
performance of the other party to the contract. Just as the First Amendment
plays such a role today in the realm of common law torts like libel212 and
intentional infliction of emotional distress,213 so too could it play a similar
speech-protective role in the face of contractual gag clauses.
The devil, of course, is in the details of determining precisely when and
what contractual conditions should trigger the First Amendment’s
application. A complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this
article, which instead focuses on legislative tacks, such as the Consumer
Review Fairness Act, for addressing gag clauses. Nonetheless, one
intriguing possibility is to borrow a standard that now controls the Supreme
Court’s abortion-impediment jurisprudence.
Specifically, the Court in 2016 in Whole Women’s Health v.
Hellerstedt214 applied an undue burden standard215 to determine if two
Texas statutes adopted in 2013 violated a woman’s constitutional right to
choose to have an abortion.216 One statute required physicians who perform
abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles,217
while the other mandated that abortion clinics comply with state regulations
governing ambulatory surgical centers.218
Writing for a five-justice majority, Stephen Breyer wrote that “neither of
these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens
upon access that each imposes. Each places a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking a previability abortion, each constitutes an undue
burden on abortion access, and each violates the Federal Constitution.”219
Justice Breyer explained that the undue burden standard, derived from the
212
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Court’s 1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,220 “asks courts to consider whether any burden imposed on
abortion access is ‘undue’”221 and “requires that courts consider the burdens
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws
confer.”222
As Professor Jessie Hill explains, “[b]y focusing on the health benefits
of the law in relation to the burdens, the Court made sense of, and breathed
new life into, the undue burden standard.”223 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
writes that in Hellerstedt, the Court “stressed that in deciding whether a law
imposes an undue burden on abortion it is for the judiciary to balance the
justifications for the restrictions against their effect on the ability of women
to have access to abortions.”224
What might the undue burden standard, which considers both the
benefits and burdens of abortion-access restrictions, look like if applied to
contractual obligations curbing speech? First and importantly, the standard
recognizes that in some instances a restriction on a party’s speech rights
may actually carry significant benefits. This might be so, for instance, in
the realm of confidentiality clauses in employer-employee contracts that
prevent disclosure by employees of a company’s trade secrets225 and
intellectual property. Such clauses restrict the disclosure of proprietary
property and data that are essential for businesses to succeed today.226
Trade secrets encourage innovation and dissuade unethical behavior.227 As
attorneys Damien R. Meyer and Meaghan Kramer recently explained:
Companies invest significant resources creating
confidential and proprietary information and setting
themselves apart from their competitors.
This
information is valuable not only to its holder, but also to
220
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its competitors.
The challenge to keep secret a
company’s most valuable information has never been
greater. Temptation for employees and others to
misappropriate and misuse valuable data looms in most
industries.228
Such duties of confidentiality in these cases guard against the theft of
property – intellectual property – by individuals who seek to exploit it for
his or her own financial good, not a larger public interest. In brief, the
benefits of restricting speech are exceedingly high in the trade secret
realm,229 while the burden is not undue. As the Supreme Court recognized
more than four decades ago, “[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial
ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies
behind trade secret law.”230 The Court also remarked at that time on “the
importance of trade secret protection to the subsidization of research and
development and to increased economic efficiency within large companies
through the dispersion of responsibilities for creative developments.”231 In
summary, a confidentiality or non-disclosure clause restricting employee
speech in the trade secrets and intellectual property spaces would not
trigger First Amendment protection.
Confidentiality agreements safeguard trade secrets and intellectual
property, with the intent of encouraging innovation and thwarting theft.232
In contrast, consumer-review gag clauses are designed to stop
dissemination of both truthful facts and honest opinions that could affect
other consumers’ choices regarding fiscal expenditures and, in turn,
influence a company’s reputation and financial bottom line. Efficient
economic markets – those dependent on the free flow of such information
to weed out poorly performing products, services and businesses – are thus
unduly burdened by gag clauses. Neither innovation nor ethical behavior is
fostered by gag clauses, counter to contractual provisions restricting
dissemination of trade secrets and intellectual property.233
In summary, both state laws and the federal Consumer Review Fairness
Act of 2016 are significant, positive steps forward in allowing information
228
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– both factual and opinionated – to flow more freely from consumers to
potential consumers in the face of business-imposed gag clauses. The next
step, however, is to move beyond short-term legislative fixes to the realm of
constitutional law and, in particular, to the First Amendment. Nondisparagement clauses illustrate the importance of the Supreme Court
fashioning a layer of First Amendment protection surrounding contracts
that affect free expression. The undue burden standard may, this article
suggests, provide one viable approach for such contractual
constitutionalization.

